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Better Safe than Sorry: How Strong Voter
Identification Laws Can Protect Louisianans Against
the Double-Sided Coin of Voter Disenfranchisement
Voting in the names of the dead, and the nonexistent, and the
too-mentally-impaired to function, cancels out the votes of citizens
who are exercising their rights—that’s suppression by any light. If
you doubt it exists, I don’t; I’ve heard the peddlers of these ballots
brag about it, I’ve been asked to provide the funds for it, and I am
confident it has changed at least a few close local election results.1
- Congressman Artur Davis
INTRODUCTION
Since the 2000 presidential election, voter fraud has earned a
permanent spot in the political discourse.2 Some claim the problem
is nonexistent,3 while others point to history4 and criminal
Copyright 2014, by JULIA D’HEMECOURT.
1. Artur Davis, I Should Have Supported Voter ID Law, RECOVERING
POLITICIAN (Oct. 21, 2011), http://therecoveringpolitician.com/contributors
/adavis/artur-davis-i-should-have-supported-voter-id-law [http://perma.cc/QD8VLAHE] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). The Honorable Artur Davis is a former U.S.
congressman from Alabama’s 7th Congressional District.
2. See John Harwood, Fixing the Electoral System: Lessons From States
Hold Hope for Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2001, at A1; Randall Forsyth,
Crucial Choice, BARRON’S, Nov. 1, 2004; Laurence Hammack, Appalachia’s ExMayor Convicted Of 243 Felonies, ROANOKE TIMES (Dec. 1, 2006),
http://ww2.roanoke.com/politics/fraud/wb/93904 [http://perma.cc/T455-DQM8]
(archived Apr. 5, 2014); Kenneth R. Bazinet, Both Sides Target Voter Fraud,
Abuse, DAILY NEWS WASH. BUREAU (Nov. 02, 2008), http://www.nydailynews
.com/news/politics/sides-target-voter-fraud-abuse-army-lawyers-article-1.333750
[http://perma.cc/PS9G-KHD7] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
3. See John Wasik, Voter Fraud: A Massive, Anti-Democratic Deception,
FORBES (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/11/06/voterfraud-a-massive-anti-democratic-deception/ [http://perma.cc/5WDA-5LLE]
(archived Apr. 5, 2014).
4. See Publius, Securing the Integrity of American Elections: The Need for
Change, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 277, 278–79 (2005) (reviewing the allegations of
Lyndon Johnson’s “famed theft of his 1948 U.S. Senate Democratic primary with
Ballot Box 13” and Mayor Daly’s “long-rumored stuffing of ballots in Chicago on
behalf of John Kennedy”); Matthew Haye Brown, Democrat Withdraws from 1st
District Congressional Race After Allegations She Voted in Two States, BALT.
SUN (Sept. 14, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-14/news/bs-mdwendy-rosen-withdraws-20120910_1_general-election-voter-fraud-vote-on-localissues [http://perma.cc/4H22-XSC8] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (voting records show
that Rosen participated in both the 2006 general election and the 2008 primary
election in Florida and Maryland).
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convictions to bolster their calls for reform.5 One reform sweeping
through the states is an effort to strengthen voter identification
laws.6 The strongest of these laws requires voters to show valid
photo identification before voting.7 The theory behind these laws is
that many in-person voter fraud attempts will be thwarted if a voter
is required to prove his or her identity by standing directly in front
of the poll worker and showing an identification that matches the
information in the voting registry.8 These strict measures have
attracted vocal proponents who stress that they are commonsense
solutions to all types of in-person voter fraud9 and vocal opponents
who decry the efforts as thinly veiled attempts to disenfranchise
voters.10
The issue of disenfranchisement is a double-sided coin because
both sides of the debate can make a case for disenfranchisement.11
On one side of the coin, turning a voter away from the polls for lack
of identification directly disenfranchises that voter of his or her right
to vote. But on the other side of the coin, “[e]very vote that is stolen
through fraud disenfranchises a voter who has cast a legitimate
ballot.”12 Thus, protecting the fundamental right to vote requires a
balancing of both of these concerns.13 Using an honor system to
identify voters at the polls gives the broadest protection against
direct disenfranchisement—that of erroneously turning away
eligible voters—but the honor system allows individuals to commit
5. See Thomas Patterson, They Say Voter Fraud Doesn’t Exist. They’re
Wrong., E. VALLEY TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.eastvalleytribune.com
/opinion/columnists/article_18c26d8c-17ee-11e2-b85c-0019bb2963f4.html [http:
//perma.cc/9DBR-CBQK] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (noting that there have been
177 convictions to date for voter fraud in connection with Al Franken’s 2008
Minnesota Senate victory over Norm Coleman, which he won by only 312 votes,
and the conviction of NAACP official Lessadolla Sowers for massive voter fraud
in Mississippi).
6. See Voter ID: State Requirements, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept.
2, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/voterid.aspx [http://perma.cc/7S2R-45KS] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
7. See id.; discussion infra Part III.
8. H.R. REP. NO. 106-666 at 1 (2006) (“Presenting photo identification when
voting provides a simple and effective method for election officials to confirm
identity and eligibility.”).
9. See supra note 2.
10. See supra note 3.
11. Publius, supra note 4, at 278 (“Every vote that is stolen through fraud
disenfranchises a voter who has cast a legitimate ballot in the same way that an
individual who is eligible to vote is disenfranchised when he is kept out of a poll
or is somehow otherwise prevented from casting a ballot.”).
12. Id.
13. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966);
Michelle L. Robertson, Election Fraud—Winning at All Costs: Election Fraud in
the Third Circuit Marks v. Stinson, 40 VILL. L. REV. 869, 923 n.1 (1995).
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in-person voter fraud more easily.14 Conversely, an absolute photo
identification requirement threatens a voter’s right to cast a ballot by
imposing an additional registration requirement, but it is the
broadest protection of the interest of an eligible voter to ensure that
by catching illegally cast votes before they disappear into the ballot
box, his or her vote is not diluted.15 Clearly, legislatures must find a
solution lying somewhere between an honor system and an absolute
photo identification requirement to protect both interests.
The debate over the constitutionality of strict voter identification
laws has wound its way through state legislatures and into
courtrooms.16 For example, in 2005, Indiana passed a strict voter
identification law that requires every voter who casts a ballot on
election day to prove his or her identity with photo identification.17
This law was quickly challenged on federal constitutional grounds.18
In Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Supreme Court
upheld the law, holding it did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.19 Having suffered defeat of their
challenge, opponents of the law then refocused their attention on
state constitutional limits. In League of Women Voters of Indiana,
Inc. v. Rokita, a different organization brought suit claiming the
same law violated the right to vote and equal protection under
Indiana’s constitution.20 Indiana’s voter identification law again
withstood the challenge.21 Because the question of federal
constitutionality is settled for now, the inquiries thus turn to state
constitutions, questioning which states, if any, offer equal protection
rights greater than the U.S. Constitution and if that expanded
protection precludes a state from mandating that voters produce
valid photo identifications at the polls.
14. Polling places are the last line of defense to keep people “from taking
advantage of the ‘opportunities to vote in the name of someone whom they can
safely predict will not show up at the polls to challenge them.’” Samuel P.
Langholz, Note, Fashioning A Constitutional Voter-Identification Requirement, 93
IOWA L. REV. 731, 744 (2008).
15. Since voter identification requirements make in-person “voting frauds
practically impossible,” an eligible voter’s vote will not be cancelled out by
unauthorized voters. Id.
16. Id. at 733.
17. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185 (2008).
18. The Indiana Democratic Party initiated suit only a year after its
enactment. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006),
aff’d sub nom. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir.
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
19. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 949.
20. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 771
(Ind. 2010).
21. Id.
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This Comment examines how Indiana’s strict voter
identification law strikes the appropriate balance between the
constitutional protection of the right to vote and the State’s valid
interest in securing a fair electoral process. It then explores
Louisiana’s constitution and jurisprudence to show that Louisiana
can sustain an appropriately balanced strict photo identification
law.22 Part I overviews the different types of voter identification
laws in the United States. Part II investigates the scope of the
problem of voter fraud and how current federal legislation may, in
part, exacerbate the problem. Part III briefly outlines the U.S.
Supreme Court and Indiana Supreme Court’s analysis of the Indiana
law. Part IV applies the Louisiana constitutional analysis of the right
to vote and the right to equal protection to an Indiana-style law.
Finally, Part V discusses how new legislation, if enacted to replace
Louisiana’s current voter identification laws, should be shaped to
strike the correct balance and ultimately be sustained under
Louisiana’s constitution. In a growing and advancing democracy,
voting remains a right that is most fundamental. The protection of
this sacred right should not remain stagnant but rather should grow
and advance to meet the needs of a modern democracy.
I. OVERVIEW OF VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES
The National Conference of State Legislatures classifies states
into four categories based on their voter identification laws.23 These
categories are: (1) states that require no independent form of
identification to vote,24 (2) states that require non-photo identification
to vote,25 (3) states that require photo identification but allow a person
to cast a ballot without presenting one in many instances, and (4)
states that strictly require photo identification in order to cast a
ballot.26 To fully understand the debate, one must first understand the
distinctions in the law.
A. Non-Strict, Non-Photo Identification
State identification programs that fall into the first category
operate exactly as they sound—a poll worker asks a voter for his or
22. This Comment does not analyze whether a strict voter law would be
upheld in Louisiana by the Justice Department as part of the 1964 Voter’s Rights
Act.
23. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
24. See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/17-9 (West 2010).
25. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (Westlaw 2014).
26. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
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her name, and if that name appears in the voting registry, the voter is
given a ballot.27 Illinois is one example. Under the Illinois Election
Code, “[a]ny person desiring to vote shall give his name and, if
required to do so, his residence to the judges of election.”28 The
judge then repeats this information out loud in a “distinct tone of
voice, clear, and audible” and checks the register to make sure the
information matches a voter in the registry.29 If the information
matches the registry, the person is given a ballot and allowed to
vote.30
B. Strict Non-Photo Identification
The second categorization encompasses state programs that
require the voter to show some independent form of identification to
corroborate his or her identity but not necessarily one with a photo.31
Virginia is one such state.32 According to the Virginia Code, an
election officer must verify that the person present is “a qualified
voter before admitting him to the voting booth and furnishing an
official ballot to him.”33 In Virginia, the election officer must ask the
voter his or her name and address and repeat them out loud.34 The
officer then must ask the voter to provide a single form of
identification, including a registration card, social security card,
“valid Virginia driver’s license, . . . concealed handgun permit,” any
identification issued by a Virginia state agency, a student
identification from a Virginia university, an employee card with a
photo, “or a copy of a current utility bill, bank statement,
government check, or a paycheck that shows the name and address
of the voter.”35 Therefore, a photo identification is accepted but is
not required to vote.
C. Non-Strict Photo Identification
The law currently enforced in Louisiana is one example of the
third category of voter identification laws—those that have a nonstrict photo identification requirement.36 When a Louisiana voter
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See also 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/17-9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-643 (Westlaw 2014).
Id.
Id.
Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
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goes to the polls, he or she must identify him or herself to the poll
worker and list his or her address.37 The information provided by the
voter must then be stated out loud by the poll worker in front of
bystanders.38 Next, the voter must present “a Louisiana driver’s
license, a Louisiana special identification card . . . or other generally
recognized picture identification card that contains the name and
signature of the applicant.”39 If a registered voter does not have a
photo identification that meets the legal requirements, he or she is
allowed to vote but first must swear by affidavit to his or her identity
and lack of identification.40 After completing the affidavit, the voter
is allowed to vote.41 The ballot is not conditioned on any further
action.42 It is cast and counted just like any other ballot cast in that
election.
D. Strict Photo Identification
The fourth category of voter identification requirements, a strict
photo identification law, is different from the third category in one
clear way—a voter who does not have a photo identification on
election day is required to return at a later date and provide one
before his or her provisional ballot is counted. For example, to vote
at the polls in accordance with Indiana’s strict voter identification
law, a voter is required to produce “proof of identification”43 by
showing a document issued by Indiana or the United States that has
not expired and contains his or her name and a photograph.44 If the
name on the provided identification matches the precinct register
and the would-be voter matches the photo, then the person is
allowed to vote.45 If, however, the voter is “unable or declines to
present the proof of identification,” the voter must fill out an
affidavit46 to receive a provisional ballot.47 This is where the key
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562(A)(1) (2009).
38. Id.
39. Id. § 18:562(A)(2).
40. Id. The 2012 revision to Louisiana’s Election Code now requires the voter
to swear to additional information contained in the voter registry such as date of
birth. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1 (Westlaw 2014).
44. Id. § 3-5-2-40.5.
45. Id. § 3-11-8-25.1.
46. Id. § 3-11-8-23. In the affidavit the affiant must swear to U.S. citizenship,
date of birth, residency, name, that he or she will not be voting in another precinct
for that election, occupation, address, and to the understanding that lying in an
affidavit is a punishable crime. Id. Louisiana’s affidavit only requires the voter to
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difference from the previous statutory scheme lies—the provisional
ballot will only be counted if the voter returns to the registrar’s
office within ten days of the election and satisfies the identification
requirement.48 This law ensures that, by and large, all votes cast on
election day are cast by a registered voter and not an imposter. This
scheme clearly provides more protection against in-person voter
fraud than the other types of laws but also places the most burdens
on the voter.49
II. STATE’S INTEREST IN REFORM
This Part looks to two important factors in determining whether
a state’s concern over voter fraud is warranted. First, this Part
examines whether voter fraud exists at all and, if so, whether photo
identification requirements would help solve this problem. Second,
this Part will explore federal legislation on voter registration and
how it has made voter fraud easier to accomplish.
A. Does Voter Fraud Exist?
Since the time of the colonies, Americans have gone to the polls
to vote.50 Even in the early days of this nation, poll workers
attempted to protect this right from voter fraud.51 This led many
colonies to follow in the British tradition of recording votes by
voice, which included recognizing an elector by name in front of
neighbors and friends with the belief that the voter’s identity was
confirmed by the onlookers.52 This tradition of declaring one’s
identity out loud “in the presence and view of the bystanders” is a
tradition that continues today in many states, including Louisiana.53
However, while this practice was once effective in small
communities, it is no longer the failsafe it once was.54
swear to date of birth and mother’s maiden name. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:562(A)(2).
47. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1.
48. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5.
49. Langholz, supra note 14, at 744.
50. Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG (Sept. 15,
2011, 6:26 PM), http://www.history.org/foundation/journal/spring07/elections.cfm
[http://perma.cc/3G22-RD8Y] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562 (2009). See infra Part I.A.
54. COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS 18–19 (2005) [hereinafter BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS],
available at www1.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc
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Many claim there is no need for voter identification laws
because there is no evidence of voter fraud, pointing to the absence
of criminal prosecutions as evidence of this assertion.55 But one
does not need to look too far to find evidence of voter fraud all
around. A close look at U.S. history provides striking examples of
the problem, including a successful 14-year conspiracy to commit
massive, in-person voter fraud in Brooklyn, New York, in the 1970s
and ‘80s.56 A 1984 grand jury investigation in Illinois estimated that
more than 100,000 fraudulent ballots were cast in one local election
alone.57 And a more recent grand jury report found rampant
absentee ballot fraud in Miami, Florida.58 While determining the
exact magnitude of voter fraud is beyond the scope of this
Comment, there is no doubt that voter fraud occurs.59
In-person voter fraud can take many forms, such as felons and
non-U.S. citizens voting.60 Another form that voter fraud can take is
voter impersonation.61 This occurs when a person votes in the name
of someone else, most likely either someone the person knows has
recently moved out of the precinct or someone known to be dead.62
Impersonation can also occur when a person registers fictitious
names and then votes under those names, thus allowing one person
/GB45-2YZ3] (archived Apr. 5, 2014) (confirming the Carter–Baker
Commission’s assertion that “it is less likely that poll workers will be personally
acquainted with voters” because the average precinct size has increased in the past
century).
55. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir.
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (noting that plaintiffs used lack of voter fraud
convictions as evidence that voter fraud does not exist).
56. In the Matter of Confidential Investigation, No. R84-11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 23, 2011), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads
/1984_grand_jury_report-r84-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/43QP-LDER] (archived Apr.
5, 2014) (detailing a 14-year conspiracy to “engage[] in various fraudulent and
illegal practices designed to influence the outcome of elections”).
57. Publius, supra note 4, at 278 (discussing a 1984 federal grand jury
investigation into the 1982 Illinois election estimating that “100,000 fraudulent
votes had been cast” in the general election alone).
58. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY, INTERIM REPORT, INQUIRY INTO
ABSENTEE BALLOT VOTING (1998) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT OF MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY GRAND JURY] (detailing “evidence of outright fraud in the absentee ballot
process [that] called into question the legitimacy of two major elections” and a
“concerted effort to influence absentee ballot votes of the elderly”).
59. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 18.
60. See generally HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY, DEMOCRACY IN DANGER: CASE
STUDIES OF ELECTION FRAUD 21–29 (2008), available at www.heritage.org
/Research/LegalIssues/sr24.cfm [http://perma.cc/5784-DFZF] (archived Apr. 5,
2014).
61. Id.
62. Langholz, supra note 14, at 736–37.
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to vote numerous times.63 Another form of voter fraud occurs when
a person registers in more than one precinct and votes in each.64
These forms of voter fraud have been “enabled by the ‘honor
system’ of voting prevalent in nearly all states until recent years”65
and can be accomplished by individual voters or by concerted
efforts of grassroots organizations.66
Not all of these forms of in-person voter fraud can be solved by
implementation of a voter identification law, but some certainly can.
For example, ineligibility to vote due to felony conviction would not
be detectable by simply showing photo identification. But given the
logistics of getting an identification card, virtually all types of voter
impersonation would be stopped. A person wishing to impersonate
someone else would simply be unable to acquire an identification
that has his or her picture with the name and address of the neighbor
or fictitious person that he or she fraudulently registered. Thus,
requiring photo identification virtually halts this form of voter
fraud.67
Without the help of photo identification, detecting and
prosecuting voter fraud can be very difficult.68 Imagine the
following scenario. A person attempting to cast a fraudulent vote
“enters the polling place, gives a name that is not his own, votes,
and leaves.”69 Finding this unnamed person later and linking him or
her to the fraud can be next to impossible.70 But once the crime is
committed, the real damage to the community is already done—the
ballot has already been cast and disappeared anonymously into the
ballot box.71 This simple fact coupled with the history of voter fraud
63. Id. See also In the Matter of Confidential Investigation, No. R84-11 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 23, 2011), available at http://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/up
loads/1984_grand_jury_report-r84-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/43QP-LDER]
(archived Apr. 5, 2014).
64. See Matthew Haye Brown, Democrat Withdraws from 1st District
Congressional Race After Allegations She Voted in Two States, BALT. SUN (Sept.
14, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-09-14/news/bs-md-wendy-rosenwithdraws-20120910_1_general-election-voter-fraud-vote-on-local-issues [http:
//perma.cc/4H22-XSC8] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
65. Langholz, supra note 14, at 736–37.
66. Id. at 736.
67. Typical requirements for getting an identification card require proof of
identity that would, in effect, prohibit any attempt at getting an identification card
in the name of another. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
68. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir.
2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. The 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington state is a perfect example.
Langholz, supra note 14, at 738. This race was decided by a 133-vote margin. Id.
The court found over 1,600 fraudulently cast votes by felons, unregistered voters,
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in the United States72 shows why a proactive attempt to prevent
voter fraud from happening in the first place is so important.73
B. Effects of Voter Fraud on the Electorate
Some of the harmful effects of voter fraud are obvious; for
example, voter fraud clearly subverts the legitimacy of competitive,
closely fought elections.74 But there are also more insidious effects
of voter fraud, such as undermining the confidence that Americans
have in their electoral system as a whole.75 Voters may very well be
driven out of the electoral process if they “fear their votes will be
outweighed by fraudulent ones.”76 Further, a lack of confidence in
the legitimacy of elections breeds distrust in the government and
elected officials.77 After tens of thousands of votes had to be
recounted in the presidential election of 2000, there was a sharp
decline in confidence in the electoral system.78 This declining
confidence in the electoral process and the almost complete failure
of electoral administration in Florida was the catalyst for the
formation of two national commissions on federal election reform.79
The first was headed by former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald
Ford (Carter–Ford Commission) and the second by Jimmy Carter
and former Secretary of State James Baker (Carter–Baker

deceased voters, or people who voted more than once. Id. But the election was
upheld “since there was no way to prove for whom the illegal votes were cast.” Id.
72. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text.
73. See Langholz, supra note 14, at 738; In re Request for Advisory Op.
Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 458 (Mich. 2007).
74. INTERIM REPORT OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY, supra note 58
(“[E]vidence of outright fraud in the absentee balloting process called into
question the legitimacy of two major elections.”).
75. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 18 (“The
electoral system cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to deter or
detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.”).
76. Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
77. Id.
78. THE NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 17 (2001), available at http://tcf.org
/publications/pdfs/pb246/99_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/3W3F-ZJ3X]
(archived Apr. 5, 2014) (stating that confidence that the electoral process was “at
least somewhat fair” fell from 75% after the 1996 election to 50% after the 2000
election).
79. The Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford Commission (Carter–Ford
Commission) was formed in 2001 in direct response to the 2000 election. Id. at 32.
The Jimmy Carter and James Baker Commission (Carter–Baker Commission) was
formed in 2005 to finish the job left undone by the Carter–Ford Commission.
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii.
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Commission). The Carter–Baker Commission’s express mission
was to “recommend ways to raise confidence in the electoral
system.”80 This commission found that few things could “undermine
democracy more than a widespread belief among the people that
elections are neither fair nor legitimate.”81
C. How Federal Legislation Has Unintentionally Enabled Voter
Fraud
The first real federal foray into voter registration was the
enactment of the National Voting Rights Act of 1993, commonly
called the “Motor Voter Law.”82 This law had a twofold effect on
state voter registration rolls. First, it required state driver’s license
applications to also serve as voter registration applications, thus
expanding voter registration outlets and voter registration rolls.83
Second, the Motor Voter Law restricted states’ “ability to remove
names from the lists of registered voters” due to inactivity.84 When
taken together, these two provisions have inflated voter registration
lists throughout the country by leaving ineligible voters on the
rolls.85 For example, when a registered voter moves to a new
precinct and registers to vote there, the Motor Voter Law requires
that the voter’s name stay on the old precinct’s registration rolls
unless he or she notifies that precinct “in person or in writing”86 or
the State follows a lengthy procedure for removal that can take more
than four years of voter inactivity and requires, among other things,
notifying the voter by mail.87
Years later, the Carter–Ford Commission attempted to solve the
problems demonstrated in the 2000 election with the Help America
Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA).88 Most of the reforms in HAVA focused
on state voter-registration efforts.89 Among other things, HAVA
80. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Langholz, supra note 14, at 745.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–3 (2006). See also Crawford v. Marion Cnty.
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 192 (2008).
84. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192. States cannot remove a voter from the
registration rolls for inactivity unless they follow the complicated procedure
specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6(c) to (d).
85. A judge in Indiana estimated their rolls “were inflated by as much as
41.4%.” Crawford, 553 U.S. at 192. Whereas another study showed that in 2004
“19 of 92 Indiana counties had registration totals exceeding 100%” of their voting
age population. Id.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6 (2006).
87. Id.
88. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at ii.
89. Langholz, supra note 14, at 745.
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imposed an identification requirement on those who registered to
vote by mail, required the registrant to declare that he or she meets
citizenship and age requirements, and required the states to maintain
the accuracy of their registration rolls.90
Both the Motor Voter Law and HAVA have had positive effects
on voting in the United States. Motor Voter decreased the burden on
voter registration by opening up new outlets, required “states to
accept mail-in registration,” and eased the process for a voter to cast
a ballot after moving to a new precinct.91 HAVA required states to
modernize their registration roll and verify the identity and
citizenship of new voters.92 But these positive effects were not
without negative effects as well—most importantly, the laws created
artificially bloated voter rolls. Since many states had to enact new
legislation to comply with HAVA,93 they took that opportunity to
fix the problems exposed in their states by the implementation of the
Motor Voter Law. Because the states could not change the
procedure for purging voter registration rolls, many turned to photo
identification laws as the solution.
III. FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Non-strict and non-photo identification laws are rarely
challenged on constitutional grounds. In almost every state where a
strict voter identification law has been enacted, however, the law has
been quickly greeted with legal challenges.94 Indiana’s law was no
different. The law was passed in 2005 as part of Indiana’s
comprehensive election reform that overhauled the State’s election
code.95 A complaint was quickly filed in the Southern District of
Indiana,96 and another suit followed in state court a few years later.97
These two cases advanced separately to the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Indiana to answer different
90. Id. at 745.
91. Id. at 743–44.
92. Id. at 745–46.
93. “[F]orty-four states were not in compliance with the new limited voteridentification requirement.” Id. at 747.
94. For example, Wisconsin’s Act 23 was enacted in the 2011 legislative
session and challenged that very same year. See League of Women Voters of Wis.
Educ. Network, Inc. v. Scott Walker, No. 11CV4669, 2012 WL 763586 (Wis. Ct.
App. Mar. 12, 2012); Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v. Walker, No. 2012AP557–
LV, 2012 WL 1020254 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012).
95. See Senate Enrolled Act No. 483, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005.
96. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 186 (2008).
97. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49D13–0806–PL027627, 2008 WL 7005824 (Ind. Super. Dec. 17, 2008).
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constitutional questions.98 The federal case, Crawford v. Marion
County, questioned whether the law was constitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.99 The state case,
League of Women Voters of Indiana v. Rokita, questioned whether
the law was constitutional under the Indiana Constitution’s Voter
Qualifications Clause and Equal Protection Clause.100 Thus, the
Indiana law is the only law that has been tested under both the
federal constitution and a state constitution.
A brief overview of these two cases will give a full picture of
factors to which courts have turned to determine whether a law
meets the constitutional protections provided. In addition, there are
many similarities between the protections provided under Indiana’s
constitution and those provided under Louisiana’s. Therefore, a
close look at the Indiana Supreme Court case will aid in the analysis
of whether an Indiana-style law can be implemented in Louisiana.
This Part focuses on the different tests employed in the two
court systems for the relevant constitutional analysis. First, this Part
overviews the balancing test used to evaluate a federal equal
protection challenge to a voting regulation. Second, this Part
explores the state constitutional concerns, including the right to vote
under Indiana’s constitution and the two-pronged test used to
evaluate equal protection challenges in Indiana.
A. Federal Equal Protection Analysis: Balancing the Interest of the
State with the Burden on the Voters
The right to vote is not expressly guaranteed in the U.S.
Constitution.101 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared it a
fundamental right on which all other rights depend.102 Typically
under federal jurisprudence, if a law burdening a fundamental right
is challenged, the court must evaluate the law with the highest form
of scrutiny available—strict scrutiny.103 In evaluating constitutional
challenges to voting regulations, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
has declined to impose strict scrutiny unless the burden placed on

98. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181; League of Women Voters of Ind. v. Rokita,
929 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. 2010).
99. Crawford, 553 U.S. 181.
100. League of Women Voters of Ind., 929 N.E.2d 758.
101. Robertson, supra note 13, at 923 n.1.
102. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966);
Robertson, supra note 13, at 923 n.1.
103. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1105 (La.
1985).
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voting constitutes a “severe restriction.”104 Because of the obvious
need for government to regulate elections105 and the constitutional
right to do so,106 the Supreme Court reasoned that “subject[ing]
every voting regulation to strict scrutiny . . . would tie the hands of
States seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently.”107
Therefore, the Court developed a two-part balancing test to
evaluate laws that burden the right to vote.108 Under this test, a court
balances “the precise interests put forward by the state as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule”109 with the
“character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected.”110 When balancing these factors, the court must focus on
the “legitimacy and strength of each of those interests” and the
“extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff’s rights.”111
1. Indiana’s Interest
Indiana set forth three distinct interests in requiring voters to
present a valid photo identification at the polls.112 They were: (1) a
desire to modernize election procedures, (2) an interest in “deterring
and detecting voter fraud,” and (3) an interest in “safeguarding voter

104. If voting is severely restricted, then the restriction “must be ‘narrowly
drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.’” Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428, 434–34 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289
(1992)).
105. “Common sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion
that government must play an active role in structuring elections; ‘as a practical
matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes.’” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730
(1974)).
106. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
107. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
108. This test was first introduced in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789 (1983). However, the Court in Crawford notes that this test is consistent with
cases decided prior to Anderson, including the 1966 case, Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd.,
553 U.S. 181, 189–90 (2008).
109. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 191.
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confidence.”113 The U.S. Supreme Court held all three interests to be
valid concerns that could warrant appropriate regulation.114
In evaluating the State’s interest in modernizing election
procedures, the Court pointed specifically to the effects that the
Motor Voter Law and HAVA have had on voter registration across
the country.115 The salient point that the Court relied on included the
restrictions that the Motor Voter Law has imposed on states for the
removal of inactive voters from the rolls, holding the law to be at
least “partly responsible for inflated lists of registered voters.”116
The Court also took particular notice of the fact that HAVA itself
imposed an identification requirement on newly registered voters
and that HAVA and the Motor Voter Law both “indicate that
Congress believes that photo identification is one effective method
of establishing a voter’s qualification to vote and that the integrity of
elections is enhanced through improved technology.”117
Moving on to Indiana’s declared interest in deterring and
detecting voter fraud, the Court began by noting that the State did
not provide any evidence of actual fraud in Indiana.118 However, the
Court found Indiana’s interest to be reasonable for two reasons.119
First, the Court noted sufficient historical documentation of voter
fraud in the United States, including not only recent examples of
fraud but also recent examples of fraud in Indiana.120 Based upon
this evidence, the Court unequivocally stated that “the risk of voter
fraud [is] real [and] that it could affect the outcome of a close
election.”121 Second, the Court stated that an interest in the “orderly
administration [of elections] and accurate record keeping” alone
“provides sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters
participating in the election process.”122 When coupled with the
bloated voter rolls due in part to the Motor Voter Law, the Court
found that Indiana had proven a “nondiscriminatory reason for
supporting the . . . decision to require photo identification.”123
The final interest put forth by Indiana, safeguarding public
confidence in the electoral system, is strongly related to deterring
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 192–94.
116. Id. at 192 (pointing to the record that shows that “as of 2004 Indiana’s
voter rolls were inflated by as much as 41.4%”).
117. Id. at 193.
118. Id. at 194.
119. Id. at 195–96.
120. Id. (noting absentee ballot fraud in the 2003 Democratic primary election
in East Chicago, Indiana).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 196.
123. Id. at 196–97.
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and detecting voter fraud.124 The Court stressed, however, that it has
“independent significance, because it encourages citizen
participation in the democratic process.”125 Overall, the Court found
that Indiana had sufficient interests to burden voters with the
requirement of showing a photo identification when voting in person
at the polls.126 This interest must be weighed against the burden
placed on the voters and must be “sufficiently weighty to justify the
limitation” in order to uphold the law.127
2. Character and Magnitude of the Injury to the Right to Equal
Protection
After having established that Indiana was justified in enacting a
voter identification requirement, the Court then weighed the
justification against the magnitude of the burden placed on the
voters by requiring photo identification.128 First and foremost, the
Court noted that “the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a
photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’
right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual
burdens of voting.”129 However, the Court recognized that a heavier
burden might be placed on certain groups of voters who do not have
identification, such as the elderly and the poor.130 Therefore, the
Court looked specifically to the burden imposed on the small portion
of the population that lack identification.131
The Court was very clear that the challengers bore a heavy
burden because they were seeking to fully invalidate the law.132
They failed to meet this burden for a few reasons.133 First, the record
did not include information that allowed the Court to quantify “the
number of registered voters without photo identification.”134 Nor did
they provide any testimony of a single citizen who “expressed a
124. Id. at 197.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 202.
127. Id. at 190 (quoting Norman v. Reed 502 U.S. 279, 288–89 (1992))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 197.
129. Id. at 198.
130. Id. at 198–99 (noting the burden might be higher on “elderly persons born
out of state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate,” the poor or
disadvantaged who might have difficulty obtaining their birth certificate, the
homeless, and those who object to being photographed for religious reasons).
131. Id. at 199.
132. Id. at 200.
133. Id. at 199–202.
134. Id.
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personal inability to vote” under the Indiana law.135 Because the
plaintiff could neither establish that the law had actually burdened
anyone nor present a number of voters who might be burdened by
the law, the Court determined the magnitude of the burden to be low
at best.136
Next, the Court pointed to four provisions of the law that
mitigated the burden placed on those without identification.137 Most
importantly, the Court recognized the ability to vote by provisional
ballot.138 Voters who do not have identification on election day are
not summarily turned away from the polls.139 Every person who
claims the right to vote is, by law, allowed to cast a provisional
ballot.140 Second, the Court recognized the ability for most voters to
cast an absentee ballot for which photo identification is not
required.141 Third, the Court noted that the indigent and those with
religious objections to being photographed are allowed to vote by
provisional ballot and then sign the appropriate affidavit at the
clerk’s office within a week and a half of the election.142 Finally, the
Court noted that anyone without valid photo identification is able to
obtain free identification from the State.143 This answered the crucial
question of whether the identification requirement was in fact a poll
tax.144 Given all of the mitigating factors, the Court simply could not
“conclude that the statute impose[d] ‘excessively burdensome
requirements’ on any class of voters.”145
Although this opinion was split with three justices concurring in
judgment and two dissenting, the question of whether a strict photo
identification requirement is valid under the federal constitution is
settled for now. Because this was only a facial challenge to
Indiana’s voter identification law, an individual voter who is
disenfranchised by Indiana’s law can still directly challenge it,146 but
135. Id. at 201.
136. Id. at 202.
137. Id. at 199–202.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 199.
140. Id. In order to have a ballot counted, the voter would have to return to the
appropriate county office and produce valid photo identification, but the time
given for this allowed someone to get identification if he or she otherwise did not
have one. Id.
141. Here, the Court specifically noted the ability of all elderly to vote by
absentee without having to furnish a reason. Id. at 201.
142. Id. at 185.
143. Id. at 198.
144. Id. at 199. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
(“[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications.”).
145. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 202.
146. Id. at 200.
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given the mitigating factors of access to free identification,
provisional balloting, absentee balloting, and accommodation of
those with religious objections, it might be difficult to find a voter
who truly does not fit an exception. Therefore, for now, the analysis
of the constitutionality of photo identification laws turns mainly on
each individual state’s constitutional protections.
B. State Right to Vote Analysis: Regulations v. Qualifications
This Part reviews the challenges to Indiana’s voter identification
law under Indiana’s Constitution. While not expressly guaranteed in
the U.S. Constitution,147 the right to vote is enumerated in most
states’ constitutions, including Indiana’s.148 To qualify as a voter in
Indiana, a person must meet three requirements: (1) be a citizen, (2)
be at least 18 years old, and (3) have resided in the precinct where
he or she wishes to vote for the 30 days immediately prior to the
election.149 Therefore, citizenship, age, and residency are the only
characteristics required for one to vote. Indiana’s Constitution also
grants the Legislature the right to regulate the registration process
and, thus, impose restrictions on voting.150 Nevertheless, it does not
allow the Legislature to add new qualifications that a voter must
meet to be eligible to vote.151
In League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita, the
League challenged the same Indiana law challenged in Crawford but
brought the suit in state court to review state constitutional claims.152
The League claimed that requiring voters to possess and provide
photo identification is a new voter qualification, not a mere voting
regulation.153 They likened ownership of photo identification to
ownership of property, which was repudiated in Indiana in 1890 as
an unconstitutional qualification of voting.154 The Indiana Supreme
147. Langholz, supra note 14, at 767.
148. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. See also LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
149. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2.
150. Id. § 14(c).
151. Id. “The General Assembly shall provide for the registration of all persons
entitled to vote.” Id.
152. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 763
(Ind. 2010).
153. Id.
154. The Indiana Supreme Court struck down a law that required a voter who
was absent from the state for more than six months to provide proof that he or she
had been subject to taxation in the county during the absence. Morris v. Powell, 25
N.E. 221 (Ind. 1890). This amounted to a requirement that the voter own taxable
property in the county. Id. In other words, a voter did not qualify as having a right
to vote under Indiana’s Constitution unless he or she owned property within the
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Court disagreed, stating that requiring a voter to present a photo
identification “is not in the nature of such a personal, individual
characteristic or attribute [such as age, residency, or citizenship] but
rather functions merely as an election regulation to verify the voter’s
identity.”155 According to the court, requiring voters to produce a
valid identification will only prove that they are complying with the
“valid existing constitutional qualifications” of Indiana’s
Constitution, not some “other extra-constitutional qualification to
vote.”156
Because Indiana’s Supreme Court found the law to be a voting
regulation, the statute only needed to be uniform in its application
and afford a reasonable opportunity to vote.157 The court found
Indiana’s law to be uniform even though an identification is not
required of those voting by absentee ballot or certain groups of
people voting in person, such as the elderly who live in certain
licensed care facilities and those with religious exceptions to being
photographed.158 The court saw these exceptions as being no
different from other accommodations that the Legislature provided,
such as “absentee voting [or] early voting.”159 Next, the court was
not persuaded that obtaining identification is an unreasonable
burden, given that the Bureau of Motor Vehicles must issue a card
to anyone who meets the requirements, offer assistance in obtaining
the required documents, and make temporary identification cards
available if there is trouble obtaining all of the necessary
documents.160
C. State Equal Protection Analysis: Classifications and Unequal
Treatment
Since the court found Indiana’s photo identification law to be a
valid voter regulation, it then turned to the next inquiry—whether
the law met Indiana’s constitutional protection of equal

county. Id. This was a qualification beyond those set out in Indiana’s Constitution.
Id.
155. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 767. The State drew
the distinction that Morris was unconstitutional not because one had to provide
documentation of his or her taxable status at the time of voting but because the
voter was required to meet the additional qualification of property ownership. Id.
156. Id. at 765.
157. Id. at 767.
158. Id. at 767–68.
159. Id. at 768.
160. Id.
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privileges.161 The Equal Privileges Clause under Indiana’s
Constitution limits the State’s Legislature from enacting laws that
privilege any citizen or group of citizens over another if those
privileges are not available to all citizens of the state.162 In Collins v.
Day, the Indiana Supreme Court set out a two-part test to determine
if a law meets the Equal Privileges Clause.163 Unlike the U.S.
Supreme Court’s differing levels of scrutiny for challenges to equal
protection under the U.S. Constitution, Indiana’s test applies to all
challenges to Indiana’s Equal Privileges Clause, regardless of the
type of right infringed.164 The first prong of the test requires any
unequal treatment to be “reasonably related to inherent
characteristics [that] distinguish the unequally treated classes.”165
The second prong requires the unequal treatment to “be uniformly
applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.”166
The League contended that the voter identification law violated
the Collins test in three ways.167 First, the distinction between inperson and absentee voters “is not reasonably related to the inherent
characteristics” that distinguish these groups.168 The group argued
that this violated the first Collins prong.169 Next, the League
contended that the differences among regular in-person voters and
those in licensed care facilities were not reasonably related to the
groups’ differences.170 The League maintained that this too violated
the first Collins requirement.171 Finally, it contended that these
distinctions were not equally available to all persons similarly
situated, thus violating the second Collins prong.172
The court quickly dismissed the first argument that “the photo
identification requirement for in-person voters does not reasonably
relate to the inherent differences between in-person voters and mailin absentee voters” by focusing on the practical differences between
the classes.173 For in-person voters, the election official has the
opportunity to look at the voter and identification side-by-side to
161. Id. at 769–73.
162. IND. CONST. art. I, § 23.
163. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 769.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 770. Therefore, if someone treats blind people differently, the
different treatment should be related to their blindness. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

2014]

COMMENT

1247

verify that the person matches the photo.174 This is not the case for
absentee voters.175 While the court agreed with the League that
absentee ballots might be more susceptible to fraud and, therefore,
in need of more protection than in-person voting, the court made it
clear that absentee ballots were not the issue in this case.176 Whether
the law’s stated purpose of deterring and detecting voter fraud
would be better served if applied to absentee ballots was not the
question under Collins.177 The Collins test only required that the
actual disparate treatment created by the law be “reasonably related
to the inherent characteristics” of the groups.178 It does not matter if
the purpose would be better served if applied to a different
segment.179
The next two challenges concerned the exception for senior
citizens living in licensed care facilities.180 These voters are not
required to provide photo identification for in-person voting if their
facility is used as their polling place.181 Under the first Collins
factor, the League claimed that this creates an unequal class of
voting seniors, distinguishing between those who live in a licensed
care facility and those who do not.182 Under the second Collins
factor, the League claimed that this exception is not available to all
senior citizens, whether or not they live in a licensed care facility,
who might have difficulty obtaining photo identification.183 The
court dismissed the first argument due to the “extremely small
number of voters excluded from the photo identification
requirement,” holding that this small exception was permitted under
Indiana’s constitutional jurisprudence.184 Next, the Court answered
the League’s final claim that the law is not available to all seniors
similarly situated.185 Collins required that a strong deference be
given to the Legislature.186 Here the Court saw “the possible
absence of precise congruity in application to all voters” as worthy
of the court’s deference “[g]iven the scope of the undertaking
174. Id.
175. Id. at 771.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 770.
178. Id. at 771.
179. Id.
180. Id. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-8-25.1(e) (Westlaw 2014).
181. See § 3-11-8-25.1(e).
182. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 771.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 771–72 (citing Dvorak v. City of Bloomington, 796 N.E.2d 236,
240 (Ind. 2003), which held that the Legislature cannot “provide for every
exceptional and imaginary case”).
185. Id. at 772.
186. Id. at 770.
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embraced in the Voter ID Law’s efforts in enhancing the integrity of
the electoral process.”187
The preceding discussion demonstrates how one of the strictest
voter identification laws in the country188 withstood challenges
under two different constitutions.189 Ultimately, the Indiana
Supreme Court dismissed the case without prejudice, leaving the
door open for challenges by individual voters who are “unlawfully
prevented from exercising the right to vote” under the law.190 A key
component to the failure of both challenges was the lack of actual
proof that the law had disenfranchised a qualified voter.191 Both
courts also upheld the law because the challengers did not overcome
the high burden necessary for the relief sought—invalidation of the
entire law.192 Neither court was willing to go that far without actual
evidence of disenfranchisement.
IV. LOUISIANA’S CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Using Indiana’s law as a model and its challenges as a guide,
this Part explores Louisiana’s constitutional jurisprudence to
determine if Louisiana could implement a strict voter identification
law like that of Indiana’s. Because the law was upheld under the
federal constitution, the analysis will focus on its validity under the
Louisiana Constitution.193 Much like Indiana, Louisiana’s
Constitution grants its citizens the right to vote194 and establishes

187. Id. at 772.
188. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
189. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 188–89 (2008);
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 760.
190. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 760. This differs
from Scalia’s concurrence in Crawford, in which he stressed that individual
impacts should not determine the constitutionality of election laws in order to give
stability to the electoral process. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
191. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 201 (“The record includes depositions of two
case managers . . . none of whom expressed a personal inability to vote . . . .”);
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 772 (“[T]his case presents
only facial challenges to the constitutionality of the Voter ID Law . . . .”).
192. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 200 (“Given the fact that petitioners . . . [are]
seeking relief that would invalidate the statute in all its applications, they bear a
heavy burden of persuasion.”); League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d
at 771 (“The relief sought by the plaintiffs is that the entire Voter ID Law be
declared unconstitutional, not the overturning of the special exception for voters
living in state licensed care facilities that serve as precinct polling places on
election day.”).
193. See Crawford, 553 U.S. 181.
194. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 10, art. XI, § 1.
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equal protection of the laws.195 Therefore, just like in Indiana, any
voter identification requirement must be held constitutional under
each of these provisions.
A. The Right to Vote in Louisiana: Article I, Section 10 and Article
XI, Section 1
The right to vote is shaped by two sections of the Louisiana
Constitution. First, article I, section 10 grants all citizens the right to
“register and vote” once they reach 18 years of age.196 Therefore,
citizenship and age are the only two qualifications to vote in
Louisiana, unlike Indiana, which also has a residency
requirement.197 Section 10, adopted with the 1974 revision to the
Louisiana Constitution, is a significant change from the previous
constitutional provision.198 Prior to 1974, the Louisiana Constitution
had “broad limitations on suffrage,” including literacy, character,
and residency requirements.199 The current provision represents a
195. See id. art I, § 3.
196. Id. art. I, § 10.
(A) Right to Vote. Every citizen of the state, upon reaching eighteen
years of age, shall have the right to register and vote, except that this
right may be suspended while a person is interdicted and judicially
declared mentally incompetent or is under an order of imprisonment for
conviction of a felony.
(B) Disqualification. The following persons shall not be permitted to
qualify as a candidate for elective public office or take public elective
office or appointment of honor, trust, or profit in this state:
(1) A person who has been convicted within this state of a felony and
who has exhausted all legal remedies, or who has been convicted under
the laws of any other state or of the United States or of any foreign
government or country of a crime which, if committed in this state,
would be a felony and who has exhausted all legal remedies and has not
afterwards been pardoned either by the governor of this state or by the
officer of the state, nation, government or country having such authority
to pardon in the place where the person was convicted and sentenced.
(2) A person actually under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a
felony.
(C) Exception. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (B) of this
Section, a person who desires to qualify as a candidate for or hold an
elective office, who has been convicted of a felony and who has served
his sentence, but has not been pardoned for such felony, shall be
permitted to qualify as a candidate for or hold such office if the date of
his qualifying for such office is more than fifteen years after the date of
the completion of his original sentence.
Id.
197. See IND. CONST. art. II, § 2.
198. LEE HARGRAVE, THE LOUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 33–34 (1991).
199. Id. at 34. See LA. CONST. art. VIII (repealed 1974).
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“strong statement of a right to vote,” while also recognizing “the
state’s power to require registration as a prerequisite to voting.”200
The power to require registration, and therefore to regulate elections,
is affirmed by article XI, section 1, which instructs the Legislature to
enact an election code that “provide[s] for permanent registration of
voters and for the conduct of all elections.”201
As can be imagined, the strict voting limitations set out in
Louisiana’s Constitution of 1921 were often challenged.202 Since the
1974 revision, however, there have been a limited number of
challenges, mostly centered on the rights of felons to vote and run
for office, neither of which bear any relevance to the current
question.203 Further, since the 1974 Constitution, there has not been
a single constitutional challenge to a law adding a voter
qualification.204 Because there is no Louisiana jurisprudence on
which to base an analysis, it is helpful, although admittedly not
determinative, to look to other jurisdictions that have faced the same
question and have constitutional provisions similar to Louisiana.
Both Georgia and Indiana have faced the question of whether a
photo identification requirement was, in fact, a new voting
qualification, rather than a valid voting regulation.205 Also, both
Georgia and Indiana have very similar constitutional provisions
granting a broad right to vote.206 Therefore, their courts’ analyses
200. HARGRAVE, supra note 198, at 44.
201. “Section 1. The legislature shall adopt an election code which shall
provide for permanent registration of voters and for the conduct of all elections.”
LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. This is similar to Indiana’s provision that requires the
Legislature to “provide for the registration of all persons entitled to vote.” IND.
CONST. art. II, § 14.
202. See Hall v. Godchaux, 90 So. 145 (La. 1921) (defining an “actual bona
fide resident”); United States v. State of La., 265 F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1966)
aff’d sub nom. Louisiana v. United States, 386 U.S. 270 (1967) (declared
unconstitutional a law that denied help to those registering to vote who could not
read); Trudeau v. Barnes, 65 F.2d 563, 563–64 (5th Cir. 1933) cert. denied, 290
U.S. 659 (1933) (seeking to declare Louisiana’s Understanding Clause of the 1921
Constitution to violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
203. See, e.g., Malone v. Tubbs, 825 So. 2d 585 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (challenge
to felons’ ability to run for public office).
204. Searching the notes of decisions on Westlaw resulted in no cases.
205. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758
(Ind. 2010); Democratic Party of Ga., Inc. v. Perdue, 707 S.E.2d 67 (Ga. 2011).
206. The Indiana Constitution grants the right to vote to anyone who is a U.S.
citizen, over the age of 18, who has been a resident of the precinct in which he or
she wishes to vote for 30 days prior to the election. IND. CONST. art. II, § 2. The
Georgia Constitution grants the right to vote to anyone who is a U.S. citizen, over
the age of 18, who meets a residency requirement provided by the Legislature, so
long as that person is not disenfranchised by later provisions of the Constitution.
This article, like Louisiana’s provision, provides for the Legislature to regulate the
registration of electors. GA. CONST. art. II, § 1, ¶ II.
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can provide some guidance as to how this question should be
answered by Louisiana courts.
The Supreme Courts of both Georgia and Indiana held that
requiring a voter to produce a valid identification for in-person voting
was not a qualification because it did not amount to an inherent
characteristic such as age and citizenship.207 An identification was
merely a device to prove the person had met the qualification
requirements set out in the respective constitutions.208 While
Indiana’s court prescribed a “uniform and reasonable” test to evaluate
voting regulations,209 Georgia’s did not.210 Georgia’s Supreme Court
simply stated that “requiring an additional step in the voting process
in order to validate identity is not unconstitutional.”211
The Louisiana Constitution expressly grants the Legislature the
right to regulate the registration of voters through an election
code.212 It further expressly grants the Legislature the power to
regulate the “conduct of all elections.”213 Proving a person’s identity
by providing a valid identification falls within this power to regulate
conduct. There is no direct jurisprudence to support an argument
that this power is beyond the Legislature.214 Indeed, the Louisiana
Constitution not only allows the Legislature to regulate elections—
article XI compels it to.215 Moreover, as Indiana’s Supreme Court
noted, “[t]he fact that [people] prefer alternative procedures to the
photo identification does not create a Constitutional violation in
requiring” voters to provide one.216 Because the photo identification
law poses no additional requirement, the only concern is whether it
has an unduly disparate impact under the State’s equal protection
analysis.

207. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 758; Democratic
Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d 67.
208. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d 758; Democratic
Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d 67.
209. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 764.
210. Democratic Party of Ga., Inc., 707 S.E.2d at 73.
211. Id.
212. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
213. Id.
214. There is no jurisprudence on this issue since the ratification of the 1974
Constitution of Louisiana.
215. “The legislature shall adopt an election code.” LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
216. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 763
(Ind. 2010).
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B. Equal Protection in Louisiana: Article I, Section 3, The Right to
Individual Dignity
Equal protection is established in Louisiana under article I,
section 3—the Right to Individual Dignity.217 Louisiana’s provision
begins very similarly to the guarantee provided by the U.S.
Constitution,218 but Louisiana’s provision goes beyond federal equal
protection. First, it expressly abrogates laws that discriminate based
on “race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations.”219 Further, it
abrogates laws that discriminate based on “birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations” if the law is
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.220
During the rehearing of Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University, the Louisiana Supreme Court
established the analysis for an equal protection challenge under the
state constitution and outright rejected the federal weighing test.221
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the federal analysis made it
too difficult for the Legislature to predict the outcome of similar
cases because the court was too “preoccupied with the abstractions
of ‘fundamental right[s],’ ‘suspect classification[s],’ [and] ‘levels of
scrutiny,’ . . . instead of focusing on an open analysis of the specific
merits of the individual cases.”222
Under the analysis set out in Sibley, the court must first look to
the statute and repeal any law that discriminates on the basis of race
or religion.223 If a law classifies based on “birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations,” then the burden
is on the “state or other advocate of the classification [to] show[]
that the classification has a reasonable basis.”224 To do this, a
217. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary
servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for
crime.
Id.
218. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection); LA. CONST. art. I, §
3. Both articles prohibit the denial of “equal protection of the laws.” Id.; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
219. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
220. Id.
221. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1106 (La.
1985).
222. Id. at 1106.
223. Id. at 1107.
224. Id.
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defender of a law that creates such a distinction must prove the
classification furthers a legitimate state interest.225 If a law
discriminates on any other basis, the burden is shifted to the
disadvantaged class to show “that [the law] does not suitably further
any appropriate state interest.”226 A statute can discriminate
expressly in the language used or effectively if the statute creates
distinct groups of protected classes.227 Louisiana’s recognition of
these two types of discrimination is explored in the following
subparts.
1. Threshold Question: Is There Discrimination Expressly on the
Face of the Statute?
Given Sibley’s single standard of scrutiny for equal protection
analysis, the fact that voting is a fundamental right does not afford
any additional analysis or heightened burden on either party.228
Therefore, the threshold step of Sibley turns on the express language
in the statute.229 On its face, a voter identification law like Indiana’s
does not expressly create a distinction based on race or religion.
Instead, this type of law expressly classifies people into two
groups—those with photo identification and those without. Because
these classes are not based on race or religion, a strict photo
identification law would not be invalidated under the first hurdle of
Louisiana’s Equal Protection Clause. Neither does this classification
implicate the second standard enumerated in Sibley—classification
based on “birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliations.”230Again, the law only classifies voters based
on whether they possess photo identification. Therefore, an Indianastyle voter identification law falls to the third level of protection
under Louisiana’s equal protection analysis for discrimination on
another basis—namely whether someone has photo identification.
Therefore, any challenge to the law requires a member of the
225. Id. at 1104.
226. Id. at 1107.
227. See Johnson v. State, 965 So. 2d 866, 872 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing
the different burden a plaintiff has if the statute they complain of is facially neutral
but discriminates in effect).
228. When discussing the problems with the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-tiered
analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that “the Court’s opinions are
preoccupied with the abstractions of ‘fundamental right,’ ‘suspect classification,’
‘levels of scrutiny,’ and the like, instead of focusing on an open analysis of the
specific merits of the individual cases which would necessarily entail a balancing
or comparative evaluation of government and individual interests.” Sibley, 477 So.
2d at 1106.
229. See id. at 1107.
230. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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disadvantaged class to prove there is no valid state interest in
requiring in-person voters to present photo identification.
The language of Sibley sets up two requirements for any legal
challenge to be successful in Louisiana. First, a member of the
disadvantaged class, a voter without photo identification, must bring
the suit challenging implementation of a strict photo identification
law in Louisiana. This could be a citizen who was unable to track
down the required paperwork needed to obtain identification or
someone too poor to afford the fees for acquiring a birth certificate
needed to obtain identification. As seen in Crawford and in League
of Women Voters, it is difficult to win a purely facial challenge to a
strict photo identification law.231
Second, the challenger must prove that there is no valid state
interest in requiring in-person voters to present identification.232
This inquiry mirrors the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis more than
the Indiana Supreme Court’s.233 Proving no valid state interest is an
extremely tough bar to overcome given the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court has already declared three valid state interests that
could apply to every state in the union—modernizing the election
system, deterring and detecting voter fraud, and boosting public
confidence in the electoral system.234 All of these concerns can be
shown in Louisiana. HAVA and the Motor Voter Law were national
laws, and therefore the same problems that Indiana had in managing
its registration rolls are present in Louisiana.235 Deterring and
detecting voter fraud before it dilutes the weight of lawful votes is a
valid interest of any state,236 and boosting public confidence in the
231. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 182 (2008);
League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 772 (Ind. 2010).
232. Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107.
233. Indiana’s equal protection analysis differs from the analysis under the
U.S. Constitution and Louisiana’s. See supra Parts III.C, III.A.1–A.2.
234. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 181–82.
235. Louisiana Department of Motor Vehicle offices must act as registration
outlets, and Louisiana’s Registrar of Voters must meet the same requirements as
Indiana in removing inactive voters from their registration rolls. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 15511 (2006) (providing U.S. Attorney General with right to bring a civil action
against “any State or jurisdiction” for declaratory and injunctive relief for
violations of HAVA); see also id. § 1973gg(b)(2) (providing Congressional
purpose of increased voter participation).
236. Louisiana has a “zero tolerance policy toward voter fraud.” Protect Your
Vote: Elections Compliance Unit, LA. SECRETARY ST., available at http://www
.sos.la.gov/ElectionsAndVoting/PublishedDocuments/ProtectYourVote.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/WH46-MY98] (archived Apr. 5, 2014). The State’s interest in deterring
and detecting voter fraud is also evidenced by the Secretary of State’s Election
Compliance Unit and the Voter Fraud Hotline. See also Election Fraud and
Compliance, LA. SECRETARY ST., available at http://www.sos.la.gov/Elections
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electoral process is crucial throughout the United States because
“[l]ittle can undermine democracy more than a widespread belief
among the people that elections are neither fair nor legitimate.”237
2. Secondary Question: Is There a Discriminatory Effect, and Is
It Recognized by Louisiana’s Jurisprudence?
Because an Indiana-style law does not expressly discriminate on
any of the enumerated bases in article XI, section 3 of the Louisiana
Constitution, potential plaintiffs would have difficulty convincing a
court that the State has no valid interest in requiring in-person voters
to present photo identification. Therefore, the plaintiff might attempt
to argue that while an Indiana-style law does not expressly
discriminate on one of the bases set out in the Louisiana
Constitution, it does so in effect.
This argument would be difficult for a challenger to mount.
Under Sibley, the basis for classification is determined by looking at
the “primary cause of [a person] being assigned to one of the two
classes.”238 The primary cause in this case is whether the voter has
photo identification.239 Louisiana courts have held that to recognize
a discriminatory effect that was not the primary cause for
classification as recognized in Sibley, it must be shown that the
Legislature in some way desired that effect.240 Therefore, a
challenger would have to show that, while the law does not
expressly discriminate against these protected classes, it does so in
reality and the Legislature “selected or reaffirmed a particular course
of conduct at least in part because of, and not merely in spite of, its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”241 It is not enough that a
statute has a discriminatory effect once put into practice; the
discriminatory effect “must be traced to a discriminatory purpose to
support a claim that a statute is unconstitutional under the [E]qual
[P]rotection [C]lause.”242

AndVoting/GetInvolved/ReportElectionFraud/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.cc
/VCB-9WAW] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
237. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 1. The
Carter–Baker Commission was “formed to recommend ways to raise confidence
in the electoral system.” Id. at ii.
238. Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477 So. 2d 1094, 1108–09 (La.
1985).
239. See Id.
240. Johnson v. State, 965 So. 2d 866, 872 (La. Ct. App. 2007).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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Therefore, to prove the statute has a discriminatory effect would
require showing that eligible voters who do not have valid photo
identification are, in fact, members of a protected class and that the
law was enacted purposefully to discriminate against the class.243
The purposefulness component requires the Legislature to know that
a certain class of people would be discriminated against and to have
enacted the legislation with that intent.244 Once intentional
discrimination is established in fact, the court would follow the same
analysis as above: If the law is found to discriminate purposefully in
its effect based on race or religion, then the law would be
unconstitutional.245 Further, if the law is found to purposefully
discriminate based on “birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations,” the State would have the burden of
proving a valid state interest for the discrimination.246 In this case, it
would likely be struck down as well because there is no valid state
interest in discriminating against a voter for any of the listed
reasons. The bar for overturning a law based on a discriminatory
effect is high. But this avenue seems likely to be the most fruitful
approach in having a voter identification law declared
unconstitutional. However, given the difficulty in showing that the
Legislature intended to disadvantage a distinct class of voters, this
attack on a strict photo identification law would likely fail.
V. GOING FORWARD: SHAPING LEGISLATION
Replacing Louisiana’s current non-strict photo identification law
with an Indiana-style strict photo identification law would likely
survive a challenge under the Louisiana Constitution.247 However, a
poorly constructed law that ignores principles of Crawford and
League of Women Voters would almost certainly fail to pass
constitutional muster. Both courts took note of factors that help
create a balanced law and mitigate the burden on voters and risk of
disenfranchisement. In light of recent cases in other states, the
Legislature should pay particular attention to the implementation
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Sibley v. Bd. of Sup’rs of La. State Univ., 477
So. 2d 1094, 1107 (La. 1985). “When the law classifies individuals by race or
religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely.” Id.
246. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3; Sibley, 477 So. 2d at 1107. “When the statute
classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or
political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be refused unless the state or
other advocate of the classification shows that the classification has a reasonable
basis.” Id.
247. See supra Part IV.
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timeline and how it coincides with major elections.248 Factors that
mitigate the burden on voters and a thoughtful implementation
timeline are the two most important concerns to incorporate in any
law passed in Louisiana.249
Because the Supreme Court noted that “gathering the required
documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a
substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting,” the most
obvious mitigating factor in Indiana’s law is therefore the
availability of a free photo identification.250 Currently, a Louisiana
identification can cost anywhere from $3 to $10 depending on one’s
age.251 However, in Louisiana, a person can get an identification
card for free if they are a registered voter.252 Therefore, any concern
that obtaining identification would amount to a poll tax is already
mitigated under current Louisiana law. To get photo identification in
Louisiana, one must follow the same procedures as for a driver’s
license.253 This means that one must prove his or her identity by
bringing in two primary forms of identification, or one primary and
two secondary forms.254 These are the same requirements to obtain
photo identification in Indiana.255 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted
in Crawford, obtaining certain forms of primary identification, such
as a certified copy of a birth certificate, costs money.256 In upholding
the Indiana law, the Court allowed a fee range of $3 to $12.257 An
appropriate form of identification can be purchased within this range
in Louisiana as well.258 Therefore, the mitigating factor of a free
identification is already in place in Louisiana.
The importance of making a provisional ballot available on
election day and a procedure to have that ballot counted if the
248. See Applewhite v. Com., No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *3
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012) (analyzing implementation in upcoming election);
South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (deciding
whether to “pre-clear” the South Carolina voting law under the Voting Rights
Act).
249. An example would be the challenge to the exception in Indiana for those
living in licensed care facilities. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita,
929 N.E.2d 758, 771 (Ind. 2010).
250. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008).
251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1321(D) (Supp. 2014).
252. Id. § 40:1321(C)(1).
253. Id. § 40:1321(A).
254. Id. § 32:409.1(A)(2)(d)(x). A primary form of identification is a document
such as a certified copy of a birth certificate, a certificate of citizenship, a military
identification, etc. Id.
255. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 198 n.17.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:40 (2002).
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voter’s identity is later proven to the registrar cannot be underscored
enough and should be included in a law enacted in Louisiana.
Although the availability of provisional ballots was seen by Justice
Scalia as merely “an indulgence—not a constitutional
imperative,”259 it does prevent a substantial number of everyday
circumstances from disenfranchising a lawful voter, such as
forgetting identification, having a wallet stolen days before an
election, or forgetting to renew one’s driver’s license.260 None of
these factors should preclude a voter from casting a ballot, and
Louisiana should make certain that there is a provision in place to
account for “life’s vagaries.”261 Because one can obtain an
identification card in Louisiana in one day, a ten-day grace period to
return to the registrar’s office with a valid identification after
election day is sufficient and recommended.
Another mitigating factor briefly discussed in Crawford is the
ability to cast an absentee ballot instead of voting in person.262 Some
states, such as Georgia, allow anyone to vote by absentee ballot.263
The voter does not need to give a specific reason for requesting an
absentee ballot, such as being out of town on election day.264
Indiana, however, requires a voter to give a reason to vote by
absentee, but the State allows the elderly and disabled to vote by
absentee ballot without a reason.265 In Louisiana, one must provide
sufficient reason to cast an absentee ballot.266 Reasons such as
expecting to be temporarily out of the parish on election day for
vacation or work, attending or teaching school outside of the parish
on election day, or being a member of the armed services serving
outside of the parish are all valid reasons to cast an absentee
ballot.267 Like Indiana, Louisiana also allows the elderly and
disabled to cast absentee ballots without stating a reason.268
Therefore, Louisiana already sufficiently reduces the burden on
voters by allowing absentee balloting and, further, allowing certain
vulnerable groups to vote by absentee ballot without meeting one of
the criteria for ordinary citizens.
There are a few other mitigating factors of which the Supreme
Court of Indiana took notice that might be worth implementing in
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Crawford, 553 U.S. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 197.
Id.
Id. at 201.
GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-381 (Westlaw 2014).
Id.
Crawford, 553 U.S. at 240.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1303 (2012).
Id.
Id.
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Louisiana. First, the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles lists the
documents necessary to obtain identification online.269 This practice
reduces the number of return trips to and from the Bureau and thus
reduces the burden on the voter.270 Louisiana also has a list of
necessary documents available online; however, it is difficult to find
and should be made more readily accessible.271 Indiana’s Bureau
also has a “hotline” available to assist people in gathering the
necessary documents.272 Further, the Bureau has the ability to grant
exceptions or “use other verifiable documentation if an applicant is
reasonably unable to gather the necessary documents,” and it has the
ability to “issue an interim identification card to allow an individual
to vote while the Bureau conducts its verification of the application
for a permanent identification card.”273 All of these mitigating
factors should be seriously considered by Louisiana’s Legislature
when considering a strict voter identification law.
One final factor that the Louisiana Legislature should strongly
consider is the timing of the implementation. In recent years, at least
two states’ courts have issued injunctions to halt implementation of
a strict photo identification law.274 Neither injunction declared that
the laws unconstitutionally burdened voters.275 Rather, the
injunctions were handed down because there was simply not enough
time to ensure implementation of the law before an upcoming
federal election.276 A phase-in period was suggested in Justice
Souter’s dissent in Crawford277 and recommended in the Carter–
Baker Report.278 While a timeline that attempted to rush
implementation of a strict photo identification law will not keep a
valid law from being implemented at some point, it could delay
implementation of the law and cause unnecessary court challenges
that a well-drafted piece of legislation could easily avoid.
269. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 768
(Ind. 2010).
270. Id.
271. See Identification Cards, LA. OFF. MOTOR VEHICLES, http://dpsweb.dps
.louisiana.gov/omv1.nsf/47c22a6b4cac67ec862570c90053bd7f/2be27793a2c96e8
3862564ae0054290f?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,identification,card (last visited
Oct. 8, 2012) [http://perma.cc/M88E-46NL] (archived Apr. 5, 2014).
272. League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc., 929 N.E.2d at 768.
273. Id.
274. Applewhite v. Com., No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30
(D.D.C. 2012).
275. See Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211; South Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30.
276. See Applewhite, 2012 WL 4497211; South Carolina, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30.
277. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 231 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
278. BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS, supra note 54, at 19.
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In crafting legislation to replace Louisiana’s current non-strict
photo identification law, the Legislature should take direct note of
the factors included in Indiana’s law that helped mitigate the burden
that the identification requirement posed on the voters. It should pay
particular attention to the availability of provisional ballots and a
thoughtful implementation timeline that allows for a full and fair
implementation in advance of an upcoming election. By combining
these provisions with current Louisiana laws that allow the elderly
and other groups to vote by absentee ballot without stating a reason
and the availability of a free voter identification card,279 Louisiana
can sustain a strict photo identification law. And doing so would
help ensure confidence in the State’s electoral process.
CONCLUSION
A movement to strengthen voter regulations has swept the
country.280 As with most political issues, there are strong proponents
and opponents. The Supreme Court of the United States found that
requiring a photo identification to prove one’s identity before voting
is a valid electoral regulation under the U.S. Constitution, given the
strong interests of state governments and the small burden on voters.
States have a valid interest in modernizing the electoral system,
ensuring confidence in the electoral process, and deterring and
detecting voter fraud. These interests are only made more urgent by
the harm to the electoral process that can result once an illegal ballot
disappears into those legally cast. The inability to later retract a
fraudulent ballot is wholly different from making a lawful voter take
the additional steps of casting a provisional ballot because the
provisional ballot will in fact be counted and given the same weight
as all other ballots once the voter takes the steps necessary to
properly comply with the law. The laws that are sweeping through
the states are withstanding state constitutional challenges because
they provide the balance necessary to address this dual problem of
disenfranchisement.281
Given Louisiana’s constitutional protections and jurisprudence,
a strong voter identification law enacted for the proper purpose of
ensuring a fair and free election should withstand all constitutional
challenges. Louisiana’s Constitution directs the Legislature to enact
279. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1303 (West 2012); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1321(C)(1) (Supp. 2014).
280. Voter ID: State Requirements, supra note 6.
281. See League of Women Voters of Ind., Inc. v. Rokita, 929 N.E.2d 758, 770
(Ind. 2010); South Carolina v. United States, 898 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2012).
But see Applewhite v. Com., 54 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2012).
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an election code regulating voter registration and conduct and holds
that if a voter meets the qualifications to vote set out in article I, that
they have the right to register and vote.282 This registration
requirement presupposes that there will be additional requirements
that must be met before voting. So long as the Legislature includes
commonsense and fair mitigating factors to avoid voter
disenfranchisement, the State’s strong interest in protecting and
ensuring a fair and free election will win out. Ultimately, a strong
photo identification law ensures that voters will not lose one of their
most fundamental rights—their right to participate in the greatest
experiment of all, that of self-governing.
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